Ontology of the False State: On the Relation Between Critical Theory, Social Philosophy, and Social Ontology by Testa, Italo
Journal of Social Ontology 2015; 1(2): 271–300
Article Open Access
Italo Testa
Ontology of the False State
On the Relation Between Critical Theory, Social Philosophy, and 
Social Ontology
DOI 10.1515/jso-2014-0025
Abstract: In this paper I will argue that critical theory needs to make its socio-
ontological commitments explicit, whilst on the other hand I will posit that 
contemporary social ontology needs to amend its formalistic approach by 
embodying a critical theory perspective. In the first part of my paper I will 
discuss how the question was posed in Horkheimer’s essays of the 1930s, which 
leave open two options: (1) a constructive inclusion of social ontology within 
social philosophy, or else (2) a program of social philosophy that excludes social 
ontology. Option (2) corresponds to Adorno’s position, which I argue is forced 
to recur to a hidden social ontology. Following option (1), I first develop a meta-
critical analysis of Searle, arguing that his social ontology presupposes a notion 
of ‘recognition’ which it cannot account for. Furthermore, by means of a criti-
cal reading of Honneth, I argue that critical theory could incorporate a socio-
ontological approach, giving value to the constitutive socio-ontological role of 
recognition and to the socio-ontological role of objectification. I will finish with 
a proposal for a socio-ontological characterization of reification which involves 
that the basic occurrence of recognition is to be grasped at the level of back-
ground practices.
Keywords: Social ontology; Critical theory; Recognition; Reification; Searle; 
Honneth; Horkheimer; Adorno.
Prof. Italo Testa, Department A.l.e.f. – Philosophy, Università di Parma, Via D’Azeglio 85, 
43100, Parma, Italy, e-mail: italo.testa@unipr.it
 ©2015, Italo Testa, published by De Gruyter.  
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.
Brought to you by | Università degli Studi di Palermo
Authenticated
Download Date | 9/24/15 10:08 AM
272      Italo Testa
1  Introduction
In this paper I will analyze certain aspects of the relation between social phi-
losophy, social ontology, and critical theory. On the one hand, I will argue that 
critical theory needs to make its socio-ontological commitments explicit, whilst 
on the other hand I will posit that social ontology needs to amend its formalistic 
approach by embodying a critical theory perspective. A key role in my argumen-
tative strategy will be played by the notion of ‘recognition,’ which will serve as 
a bridge category between contemporary social ontology – where recognition is 
addressed mainly in terms of the act of ‘acceptance’ of statuses – and contempo-
rary critical theory – where the intersubjective dynamics of recognitive interac-
tion between agents is thematized (Habermas 1994; Honneth 1995).
In the first part of my paper I will discuss how the question of the relation 
between social philosophy, social ontology, and critical theory was posed in Max 
Horkheimer’s essays of the thirties, and I will explore two options that these texts 
leave open within classical critical theory: (1) a constructive and critical inclu-
sion of social ontology within social philosophy, or (2) an understanding of social 
philosophy that excludes social ontology. In the second part of my paper, leaving 
option (1) in the background, I will analyze some general features of a prominent 
contemporary model of social ontology, namely John Searle’s “philosophy of 
society” (Searle 2010, p. 5), which could be read, to use Horkheimer’s terms, as a 
contemporary example of constructive inclusion of social ontology within social 
philosophy. I will offer a critical analysis of Searle’s approach, assessing both its 
value as a contribution to an understanding of recognition (qua acceptance) in 
terms of social ontology – including what might be called a post-metaphysical 
re-evaluation of the problem of objectification – as well as the shortcomings of 
Searle’s formalistic approach to social reality, which leads to a constructive yet 
uncritical way of including social ontology within social philosophy. In the third 
part of my paper I will consider the traditional rejection of social ontology in the 
Frankfurt School critical theory – option (2) – which is epitomized by Theodor 
W. Adorno’s labeling of dialectics, both of the Hegelian dialectics of objective 
spirit and his own negative dialectics, as an “Ontologie des falschen Zustandes”: 
“ontology of the false state of things”, or “ontology of the false condition” (Adorno 
1966/1973, p. 11, my translation). I will try to show that such a negative understand-
ing is in fact forced to resort to a hidden social ontology. Thus the very idea of an 
“ontology of the false state” can become productive once its paradoxical character 
is amended and the socio-ontological commitment of critical theory is explicitly 
articulated. In the fourth part of my paper I will try to put forward some ideas on 
how option (1) could be pursued and reconstructed within contemporary debates. 
In this sense I will explore some ideas on how critical theory, understood as a kind 
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of social philosophy that is both descriptive and critical, could incorporate a socio-
ontological approach, giving value both to the constitutive socio-ontological role 
of recognition, and to the socio-ontological role of objectification. This will lead 
me to argue that a distinction between recognitive ‘objectification’ and ‘reification’ 
should be reintroduced in order to make sense of the very idea of an “ontology 
of the false state”. I will then try to read Axel Honneth’s fundamental ontology 
of recognition and his theory of reification within the framework sketched out 
so far, developing some ideas on how an ontology of intersubjective recognition 
could be combined with a social ontology of the constitution of objective spheres 
through recognitive objectification. I will then go back to Searle, arguing that even 
his theory immanently demands a distinction between objectification and reifica-
tion to be drawn. I will finish with a proposal for a socio-ontological characteriza-
tion of reification – understood as having the habitual mode of being of a second 
nature – which means that the basic occurrence of recognition is to be grasped at 
the level of background practices, pre-intentional habits, rather than at the level 
of intentional beliefs and attributive practices.
2   Horkheimer and the Task of Social Philosophy: 
Two Options
In his 1931 essay ‘The Present Situation of Social Philosophy and the Tasks of 
an Institute for Social Research’ Horkheimer connects social philosophy with the 
idea that there are certain phenomena that can be understood only in relation to 
the “context of human social life” (Horkheimer 1931/1993, p. 1). This idea, arising 
from German Idealism, is connected (according to Horkheimer) with an ontologi-
cal commitment: i.e., the thesis that a certain ontological structure exists that is 
wider than the personal sphere of individuals and that can be discovered only 
within “social totality”, that is, within the “collective whole in which we live” 
(Horkheimer 1931/1993, p. 2–3). This is also the socio-ontological core of the Hege-
lian notion of objective spirit – the idea that our being, in its content and its value, 
is socially mediated, namely that it can be known only within the social totality 
through which it is constituted.
According to Horkheimer, the social philosophies of his time, such as Neo-
Kantian philosophies of value (Hermann Cohen), or phenomenological social 
ontology and material ethics (Max Scheler, Nicolai Hartmann and Adolf Reinach) 
all share the exigency of a “new philosophy of objective spirit” (Horkheimer 
1931/1993, p. 5), insofar as they all understand individual, personal existence as 
mediated by an objective, supra-personal sphere of social being: that is, insofar as 
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they all share that ontological commitment. Horkheimer wants us to see the short-
comings of these philosophies of society. Here it is important to note that these 
shortcomings, according to Horkheimer, do not consist in the socio-ontological 
commitment itself, but rather in the way in which it is conceived, that is, in the 
fact that “objective spirit,” the “supraindividual sphere” of sense, “national char-
acter,” “social world” and the like, are understood – and thus reified – as origi-
nal, essential and “more authentic” ontological forms (Horkheimer 1931/1993, 
p. 7), rather than as historical and concrete forms of being that can be subjected 
to internal criticism. Furthermore, Horkheimer criticizes the tendency to under-
stand social philosophy as an a priori, merely descriptive knowledge, concerned 
with the description of such a fundamental sphere of social being: a knowledge 
that can be developed independently of the results of empirical sciences, consist-
ing entirely of foundational issues that cannot be falsified by empirical research 
and over which social reality cannot exert a critical control.
When Horkheimer, in his 1937 essay “Philosophy and critical theory”, comes 
to delineate the features of a critical theory of society, he understands it as incor-
porating the core idea of the social philosophy emerging from German Idealism –  
that is, as conceiving social objects and their perception as something that is not 
simply given by nature, but also constituted, and dependent for their existence and 
structure on human activities (Horkheimer 1937). He now sees the principal limit 
of German Idealism consisting in the fact that its authors understood the human 
activity that manifests itself in social facts as “merely spiritual”, that is as a formal, 
abstract and disembodied subjective intentional activity. In contrast, critical theory 
realizes that it is only through the material and concrete process of social labor 
within the social totality that one can really appreciate how human activity mani-
fests itself in social facts. Again, the great divide between idealistic philosophy and 
post idealistic critical theory is not constituted by the ontological commitments 
concerning the social world – since this is something they both share.
If we read Horkheimer in this way, I think there are at least two ways to 
develop his notion of a critical theory. Let us keep in mind that Horkheimer under-
stands critical theory as a kind of post-traditional social philosophy that is both 
descriptive and critical of social phenomena – and that according to him critical 
theory can only be both insofar as it understands social phenomena dynamically, 
as constituted through material social practices within the social world. Further-
more, according to Horkheimer, such a critical social philosophy must retain a 
dialectical relation with the praxis and contents of particular social sciences, and 
thus should not be understood as an a priori foundation that can be developed 
independently of empirical research.
Option (1) would be to embody social ontology within critical theory, that is, to 
explicate the latter’s ontological commitments affirmatively in a socio-ontological 
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theory. This is an option that the texts of the thirties do not explicitly exclude and 
that they thus leave open. The problem with traditional theories, as said, is not in 
their ontological commitments, but rather in their understanding of ontological 
forms as something “original,” “substantial,” and “fundamental.” This means 
that there is room for a different development of the ontological core of the theory.
Option (2) would be to consider ontological theory in general responsible for 
the reification of social being. Critical theory would of course not cease to have 
ontological commitments, but this option means that it could not develop them 
into a consistent, affirmative socio-ontological theory, as ontological forms were 
seen as invariant structures. In this alternative, ontological theory in general 
is considered as a form of reifying “identity thinking,” always keen to trans-
form whatever comes under its grip into essential, meta-historical structures. 
Option (2) is in fact the one that was adopted in later decades by Adorno, who 
in the early 1930s was still open to the possibility of developing a historical and 
social dialectical ontology of natural being (Adorno 1932/1984, p. 120–121), but 
successively, due to the increasing sharpness of his critical confrontation with 
Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, came to identify ontology with identity think-
ing, ending up in his Negative Dialectics in the paradoxical notion of “ontology of 
the false state.” I will return to this notion and to the option that it implies below. 
What I would like to do next, is to discuss a leading contemporary project that 
develops social philosophy in terms of a social ontology. I will first provide an 
analysis of its basic features and then assess it in light of option (1), in order to 
see whether this contemporary constructive inclusion of social ontology in social 
philosophy could also satisfy the desiderata of critical theory.
3  A Critical Analysis of Searle’s Social Ontology
Searle’s social ontological project – first expounded in The Construction of Social 
Reality (1995) and later developed and amended in Making the Social World (2010) 
– fundamentally addresses the problem of the constitution of social reality. Accord-
ing to Searle social reality is to be understood as a reality sui generis, which differs 
from first natural entities that can be described exhaustively in physical, chemi-
cal and biological terms, and whose mode of being is assumed to be independent 
of the existence of intentional agents. In contrast, social objects such as money, 
rights, or other institutions, are in a certain sense constituted, or “ontologically 
subjective”: their being depends on the existence of agents and their intentional 
activities. Such entities can nevertheless be known as really out there, which is to 
say that they are “epistemologically objective”: they can be assessed intersubjec-
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tively as something that has objectively knowable properties. The “social world” 
is thus understood in Searle’s theory as something that is both constituted and 
nonetheless real: as an objective sphere. One might say that it is understood as 
a second natural reality: a second level of existence that differs from the way of 
being of merely first natural entities. Searle’s ontology of the social world is clearly 
a contemporary theory that concerns the sphere that Hegel (and Horkheimer after 
him) called objective spirit and understood as a second natural realm of being 
(Hegel 1821/1991, par. 151). One does not have to share Hegel’s metaphysics, what-
ever it might be – in fact both Horkheimer and Searle do not – to make sense of the 
idea of the social world as something both constituted and objective.
3.1  Recognitive Constitution
I will next reconstruct the fundamental core of Searle’s social ontology from a 
recognition-theoretical perspective, in a way that makes explicit that the mode 
of being of social reality is a ‘recognitive’ one, constituted through recognitive 
activity. Once we have established that recognition plays, implicitly or explic-
itly, a fundamental role in Searle’s theory, and that his social ontology unveils 
certain important features of this phenomenon, we are better positioned to iden-
tify important areas of common ground that it shares with contemporary critical 
theory. The idea of an intersubjective constitution of social phenomena through 
a dynamic of reciprocal recognition or acknowledgment between agents plays an 
important role in the Frankfurt School critical theory, but the socio-ontological 
implications of recognition have remained undeveloped in it. On the other hand, 
I will argue that Searle’s grasp of the phenomenon of recognition, while revealing 
its socio-ontological significance, does not capture adequately its intersubjective 
dynamics. This means that critical theory and Searle’s social ontology can profit 
from each other, as the latter helps in articulating the ontological implications 
of the first, while the first helps in revealing the intersubjective dimensions of 
recognition undeveloped by the latter.
The recognitive aspect of Searle’s theory is something that remained con-
cealed in Searle’s The Construction of Social Reality (see Testa 2011) and that 
Making the Social World makes somewhat more explicit, though even there Searle 
never quite appreciates the significance of this concept for social ontology, nor 
develops it theoretically. In what follows I will try to unpack the significance of 
the concept of recognition for Searle’s social ontology and point out a way in 
which this notion should be developed in order to gain theoretical weight and 
to overcome what I will argue to be the shortcomings of Searle’s approach to 
intentionality.
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According to Searle the social world is a world of statuses. Status is the fun-
damental way of being of social objects. Social entities are such that they perform 
their functions not in virtue of their physical or chemical properties. For example, 
a coin is money not because of the first natural properties of the metal of which 
it is made (money can be made of totally different matter or of no matter at all, as 
in the case of electronic money), but because of its having the status of money, 
that is, because of its being taken collectively to be money. Social objects have 
objective properties that do not depend on the first natural properties of physi-
cal objects but that are ontologically dependent for their existence and for their 
maintenance on intersubjectively shared recognition.
Searle analyzes the assignment of status functions somewhat differently in 
the two books mentioned above. In The Construction of Social Reality he con-
ceives assignment under the general model of imposition of functions on pre-
existing natural objects. This model of assignment is expressed by the logical 
formula of linguistic constitutive rules “X counts as Y in C” – implying that the 
existence of social entities in a social context C required the existence of a first 
natural object, event or person X on which the function Y is imposed (Searle 1995, 
p. 28). In Making the Social World Searle faces the problem of the “free-standing Y 
terms” (Searle 2010, p. 20–21), that is, the fact that in some cases assignment does 
not require a pre-given thing or person on whom the status is imposed. Think 
of institutional entities such as corporations: these are social objects where a 
status function is at work without there being a pre-existing thing or person who 
is counted as its bearer. This leads Searle to fundamentally reframe institutional 
entities as something that is brought into existence by being represented as exist-
ing, as occurs in performative utterances, where a promise is created by saying “I 
promise”. This model of assignment, understood as linguistic declaration, can be 
expressed by the general formula “we (or I) make it the case by declaration that 
the Y status function exists in context C” (Searle 2010, p. 93). The formula of con-
stitutive rules “X counts as Y in context C” is now understood as a form of declara-
tion which Searle calls “standing declaration” because, through the application 
of a constitutive rule, it makes it the case, but it applies in the indefinite future to 
“an indeterminate number of such somethings” (Searle 2010, p. 97).
What is relevant for our purposes is that in both models – the first conceiv-
ing status function assignment in terms of constitutive rules (Searle’s model I1) 
and the second in terms of performative declarations (Searle’s model II2) – the 
1 This model of assignment is expressed by the logical formula of linguistic constitutive rules: “X 
counts as Y in C”: as if it were always required, for there to be social entities in a social context 
C, the existence of a first natural object, event or person X on which the function Y is imposed.
2 This model of assignment, understood as linguistic declaration, is expressed by the general 
formula: We (or I) make it the case by Declaration that the Y status function exists in context C.
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fundamental operation that constitutes social entities involves an act of recogni-
tion or acceptance. Status functions come into, and remain in, existence if and 
only if they are “recognized or accepted” (Searle uses “recognition” and “accept-
ance” as synonyms) (Searle 2010, p. 8). Once one comes to see all the conse-
quences of this that Searle himself does not follow, then I think the ontologically 
constitutive role shifts from the logico-linguistic operation to which Searle attrib-
utes the fundamental role to recognition. Thus recognition, whatever it is exactly 
– and here Searle does not help us much, since recognition remains in his model 
a primitive, not further analyzed notion – seems to implicitly play an ontological 
constitutive role in this model. One could say that social constitution is a recogni-
tive constitution, since for there to be social objects, that is entities whose funda-
mental properties are statuses, there must be practices of recognition on which 
the existence and maintenance of such statuses depends.
If this is the case, then recognition plays a socio-ontological role insofar 
as it is a matter of what might be called ‘objectification’: a notion, implied by 
Horkheimer’s understanding of objective spirit, which Searle does not use but 
that may be applied to redescribe his understanding of social reality as something 
that comes into existence because of subjective human activities of acceptance. 
Understanding the social world – objective spirit – as a matter of objectification 
might not be just an old fashioned strategy based on a substantial and finally 
subjectivist and Promethean notion of spiritual activity, as has often been argued 
against the Hegelian model of objectification and its consequences in the Marxist 
tradition (for this criticism see for example Haber 2007, p. 148–149). The appre-
ciation of the ontologically constitutive role of recognition may open the way to 
a kind of post-metaphysical – at least in the sense of uncommitted to subjectiv-
ist metaphysics – reconstruction of the notion of objectification: we can think of 
social objects as entities that are constituted through the objectification of rec-
ognitive practices, or in other words as a kind of social embodiment of interindi-
vidual practices of reciprocal recognition.
3.2  Some Shortcomings of Searle’s Models
So far I have tried to appropriate within a recognition theoretical perspective 
some insights from Searle’s social ontological model. More exactly, I have derived 
the recognition theoretical approach from Searle’s own model(s) by making 
explicit the dependence of status function assignment on acts of recognition. 
Once this substantial role played by recognition within Searle’s model(s) is ascer-
tained and its ontological meaning clarified, we can pin down the shortcoming 
of Searle’s social ontology in its incapacity to account for its own presupposition: 
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there is no theory of what recognition exactly consists of and of its relation to 
intentionality.3
Performative declarations, and the exercise of deontic powers implied by 
the application of constitutive rules are, hence, the intentional activities that 
according to Searle are the fundamental operators of the constitution of social 
institutional reality: they are the logico-linguistic intentional activities on which 
institutional reality depends for its existence and maintenance. My point is that 
in Searle’s model such intentional activities in fact presuppose recognition/
acceptance in order to function. Yet, his conception of the fundamental operator 
of the constitution of social reality – “We (or I) make it the case by Declaration 
that the Y status function exists in context C” – does not involve an account of 
recognition, and it leaves open the question of whether recognition is another 
kind of intentional activity, or whether it is rather some sort of pre-intentional 
background capacity or habit that enables the exercise of intentional activities 
that are constitutive of the social world.
Nor does the notion of “collective intentionality” that Searle introduces at 
some point of his account as the most primitive notion of his model (Searle 1995, 
p. 23–26; Searle 2010, chap. 3), make the situation clearer, since also the very 
notion of collective intentionality, as we will see, presupposes the notion of rec-
ognition. Searle argues that in order to give an account of social reality we have 
to admit some form of strong collective intentionality, that is, a form which is 
not reducible to individual intentionality. Certain intentional acts performed by 
individuals have a “we” form – they have to be analyzed in the “we” mode – such 
as in “we are playing the duet” – and cannot be reduced to mutual knowledge of 
“I” modes – even though their content is always an individual one. “I am playing 
the piano part” and “you are playing the trumpet,” but in “our” playing the duet 
the “we” is not simply the sum of these two individual intentional acts in the 
“I” mode (Searle 2010, p. 50). My point is that this is not an account – in terms 
of a most basic notion, i.e., collective intentionality – of what recognition is. It 
is rather an analysis of the “we” form of the formula of declarative assignment:
“We (or I) make it the case by Declaration that the Y status function exists in context C.”
3 Arto Laitinen has carefully analyzed Searle’s notion of acceptance (Laitinen 2011, p. 309–347). 
Such an analysis makes it clear that acceptance of institutions differs in many aspects from ac-
knowledgment of reasons. At the same time, Laitinen’s analysis of institution-creating accept-
ance is based on a kind of recognition modeled on deontic powers and on linguistic constitution 
through constitutive rules. This could neglect the fact – which is true for Searle’s model too – 
that, in order to create institutions, we need to presuppose, as I will argue later, a simpler form of 
pre-intentional, background recognitive constitution (which I suspect cannot be reduced either 
to acknowledgment of norms or to full-fledged recognition of persons).
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Searle himself notes that in this formula the logical operator that creates the status 
function presupposes for its existence and its functioning collective acceptance 
and recognition. Thus we must introduce a new formula:
“We collectively recognize that a Y status function exists in context C.” (Searle 2010, p. 103)
So even if Searle’s argument in favor of the irreducibility of the “we” form to 
the “I” form in the case of the constitution of social entities were sound, and 
even if we were to accept the idea that declarations are the logical operator of 
the constitution of social reality, this could not be taken as an account of what 
that “acceptance/recognition” consists of. In the end, in Searle’s model recogni-
tion reveals itself to be a more primitive notion than the kind of collective inten-
tionality expressed by “We-modes,” since the latter is accounted for by means of 
the formula “we collectively recognize that”. And the same could be said about 
the relevant “I-modes”, since in the formulation “we (or I) make it the case…”, it 
is also clear that “I-mode” intentionality presupposes here acts of recognition. 
Hence, both the collective and the individual form of individually performed 
intentional acts seem to be based on a more basic recognitive activity.
Furthermore, when Searle comes to discuss the relation between the notions 
of language, strong collective intentionality, cooperation and recognition, he 
explicitly asserts that some social phenomena can be constituted through a form 
of shared recognition that requires neither strong collective intentionality (shared 
recognition being reducible to the “I” form of individual intentionality: “I recog-
nize that you recognize that I recognize that you recognize…”) nor cooperation 
understood as the collective intention to cooperate (Searle 2010, p. 56 ff.). Thus 
we might say that strong collective intentionality and cooperation are constituted 
through recognition, whereas recognition itself is not constituted through strong 
collective intentionality or cooperation. I take this to mean that an analysis of 
strong collective intentionality cannot exhaust the notion of recognition, but 
somehow presupposes it. If recognition is in fact the most basic concept in the 
model, then one could ask what is the point of adding “collective intentionality” 
to the picture. Either it is identical with “collective recognition” – and thus may 
be eliminated in favor of the latter – or else it is derived from it. If the latter is the 
case, then it would be useful to give an account of how intentional phenomena 
– be it individual or collective ones – are constituted by recognitive dynamics. 
Furthermore, since recognitive acts seem to be presupposed by intentional acts 
both in the “I-mode”, and in the “We-mode”, it seems plausible to think that by 
further investigating the embodied social dynamics of interindividual recognition 
we can gain better understanding of the otherwise rather obscure switch from the 
“I-mode” to the “We-mode” (and vice versa) of individual intentionality.
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The unclear relation between strong collective intentionality, weak collective 
intentionality and recognition is a sign that Searle’s analysis lacks an understand-
ing of the intersubjective dynamics of recognition, and precisely of how the dyadic 
intersubjective form of I-thou recognition expressed by what he calls weak collec-
tive intentionality – “I recognize that you recognize that I recognize…” – relates 
to stronger forms of triadic social recognition – “we recognize” – not reducible to 
dyadic recognition.4 The obscurity of Searle’s notion of collective intentionality, as 
well as the lack of any account of the dynamics and levels of intersubjective recogni-
tion in his theory, could in the end be related to the fact that Searle does not include 
intentional self-consciousness among the objects that are socially constituted.5 
Intentionality – be it individual or collective – is simply presupposed by Searle as a 
first natural biological phenomenon. In other words, Searle does not entertain the 
Hegelian idea, nowadays explicitly followed by authors such as Robert Brandom, 
that both individual and collective intentionality may be constituted through recip-
rocal recognition (Brandom 1999). As I have tried to argue, there is an internal 
reason why he should, namely the fact that the supposed primitive intertwinement 
between individual and collective intentionality cannot be accounted for without 
presupposing some dynamics of ‘recognition’ as constitutive of it. And here it would 
be a poor move to simply assert the primitiveness of recognition as something not 
further analyzable, since contemporary recognition theories dispose of a whole lot 
of models to account for its interindividual and social dynamics.6
4 A similar flaw in Searle’s theory has been detected by Titus Stahl, whose proposal is to ground 
collective intentionality in a normative theory of reciprocal deontic recognition (Stahl 2011, 
p. 349–372).
5 On the contrary, critical theory (see Habermas 1994; Honneth 1995) has adopted from Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Spirit the model of the constitution of self-consciousness through reciprocal 
recognition, even though the socio-ontological implications of such a notion of ‘constitution’ 
have been neglected within this tradition and may be better appreciated once we go through 
Searle’s social ontology.
6 This argument converges with Margaret Gilbert’s idea that what is missing from Searle’s ac-
count of joint actions is that they require a kind of antecedent agreement between their par-
ticipants to already be in place in order for them to be able to form the sorts of “We-intention” 
Searle speaks of. And such an agreement cannot be understood as a purely mental, “internalist 
episode,” but is rather an external, socially embodied phenomenon (Gilbert 2007). By looking at 
the phenomenon Gilbert here names “agreement” through the spectacles of the social dynam-
ics of recognition (which is by the way not only a matter of “agreement”) could lead us to bet-
ter appreciate the externalist, recognitive social preconditions of “We-intentions.” Gilbert uses 
elsewhere the notion of “mutual recognition” to analyze the presupposition of joint attention, 
but understands here under “mutual recognition” a cognitive mechanism consisting in being 
“jointly committed to recognize as a body our co-presence as beings capable of joint commit-
ment” (Gilbert 2011, p. 281) and which offers us a rather abstract and not dynamic picture of 
recognitive practices.
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Nonetheless, when he comes to consider human personhood, Searle seems 
keen to consider some of its traits – being the bearer of human rights – as socially 
constituted through dynamics that might easily be re-described in terms of rec-
ognition (Searle 2010, chap. 8). ‘Being human’, ‘being a person’7 are assumed by 
Searle to be equivalent with being assigned a status that implies being recognized 
as someone endowed with deontic powers, as a co-author of the constitution of the 
social world. Once again, the real ontological burden in the constitution of human 
personhood (for being a person) lies upon recognition. But again, Searle does not 
seem to appreciate the foundational consequences that such an understanding – 
that the social self-consciousness required for being a co-author of social constitu-
tion is itself a recognitively constituted status – may have on his model.
We could generalize our criticism of Searle by saying that his social ontology 
is fundamentally centered on the objective pole of social constitution – focus-
ing on an analysis of social objects among which it furthermore does not include 
social self-consciousness – and that it ignores the subjective-intersubjective pole 
of social constitution simply presupposing it as the intentional correlate of the 
objective pole. This way he ends up in providing a very thin – I am tempted to 
say idealistic – account of the subjective side of social constitution reduced to 
an exercise of linguistic deontic intentionality, a sort of disembodied subjective 
spiritual activity isolated from the material processes of social production and 
reproduction and from the whole complex of social totality. This is an account 
that does not consider the interaction between the subjective and objective poles, 
nor how the subjective side might be itself at least partially socially constituted. 
As a consequence, Searle’s social ontology ends up with a rather abstract and 
ahistorical account of social reality. It is an abstract account because Searle’s 
social ontology consists of a mere logical analysis which gives us a single formula 
– the formula of status function declaration – understood as the fundamental 
logical operation whose recursive application constitutes all objective spheres 
of human sociality. This way social ontology reduces itself to a formal a priori 
account, abstracted from material and historical content, which he understands 
simply as what contingently comes to fill the X in his formula (in cases where 
there is an X). This brings us back to Horkheimer’s diagnosis, as Searle’s model 
seems to fall under the criticism Horkheimer addressed to the social ontologies of 
his day and hence it does not seem to satisfy the desiderata of option (1) of being 
a social ontology which is both constructive and critical.
Secondly, Searle’s social ontology is fundamentally a sort of social static, 
because it is concentrated on the static properties of social reality. Searle under-
stands social entities as an objective reality that is constituted through status 
7 Note that Searle uses “human being” and “human person” as synonyms (see Searle 2010, p. 182).
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function declaration and recognition. But his formula of social constitution 
merely describes the structure of existing objective institutional realities – rights, 
markets, the state, and so on – having little to say about social change. How do 
such objective institutional realities change over time? Searle connects social 
change with the ad hoc supposition – a real deus-ex machina – that at some point 
there is an interruption of continuity in the acceptance of social institutions: the 
recognition presupposed by status function declaration ceases to be there. This is 
a phenomenon destined to remain rather mysterious within Searle’s model, since 
he has no theoretical means to analyze the intersubjective dynamics at work both 
in the acceptance and the refusal of acceptance of existing institutional spheres.
For these reasons Searle’s social ontology reveals itself to be a rather hyposta-
tizing philosophy of sociality. The rediscovery of the role of objectification in the 
constitution of the social world, since it is not accompanied by an intersubjective 
analysis of the dynamics of recognition, nor by an analysis of the historical and 
concrete mediation between subjective and objective pole, ends up hypostatiz-
ing social constitution – identifying it with an essential, abstract or formal inten-
tional activity. Moreover, it ends up hypostatizing social reality, conceiving it 
exclusively in terms of static objects. One could say that there are no theoretical 
means within Searle’s social ontology to distinguish between ‘objectification’ and 
‘reification’, or in other words to criticize some forms of social objectification as 
reifying in the sense of concealing their contingent, socially produced character, 
presenting themselves with the false appearance of necessity and immutability 
and thus blocking rational change of the social setting. In fact, with Searle we 
have to assume that the existence of given institutional entities implies that they 
are somehow recognized as rational, since acceptance is the ontological glue of 
institutional objects and of the sort of rationality they embody, which consists 
in the fact that institutions give us desire-independent reasons for action. Searle 
does say – having little to say on how this distinction works – that being accepted 
does not necessarily mean being approved of, nor being accepted as justified 
(Searle 2010, p. 8 and 57). Yet, acceptance is for him sufficient for the existence 
of institutional entities and hence for their basic rationality (even not approved 
nor politically justified institutions are basically rational insofar as they provide 
those who are subjected to them with desire-independent reasons to act).8
All in all, I have argued so far that Searle’s account of social reality is inter-
subjectively underdetermined, ahistorical, does not account for social change, 
8 This all seems to be related to Searle’s tendency to understand the social institutions of pri-
vate property, market economy and liberal state as justified qua existing – having survived their 
negation through socialism – and furthermore as necessary, i.e., as institutions that somehow 
develop natural traits of human beings. On private property as a basic human right see for exam-
ple Searle 2010, p. 186–187.
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and is not capable of distinguishing between objectification and reification. One 
could of course ask why this criticism should worry Searle – after all, Searle does 
not identify himself as a critical theorist and may not share its concerns. But I 
think there are internal reasons within Searle’s model to take this criticism seri-
ously. Firstly, the problem of recognition is not external to Searle’s social ontology, 
but on the contrary a foundational part of it. A comprehension of “recognition/
acceptance” requires an analysis of its intersubjective dynamics, and thus in 
order to make its own presuppositions clear, Searle’s theory would benefit from 
developing the analysis of recognition in the intersubjective direction which has 
been traced within contemporary critical theory.9 Secondly, Searle is interested in 
historical phenomena and social change and would clearly like his model to be 
capable of accounting for them.10 After all, Searle’s account of society supports 
a developmental model of human institutions, according to which there seems 
to be a growing process of institutional realization of rational freedom, where 
mere acceptance is in the long run progressively (and reflexively) substituted by 
approved, justified acceptance (Searle 2010, p. 139–144). Thus Searle subscribes 
to a dynamic and historical model of intertwinement of institutions, reason and 
freedom. But since he cannot ground his model of recognitive constitution of 
social reality in concrete and material intersubjective social practices, he cannot 
succeed in putting flesh on the bones of the model. Furthermore, the very idea 
that forms of acceptance reflexively modify themselves over time, and can be 
substituted by more approved, justified and freedom-enabling ones, seems to 
9 For an overview of the recent development of the recognitive approach see Schmidt Am Busch 
and Zurn 2010; Ikäheimo and Laitinen 2011.
10 In his reply to Jonathan Friedman, who made the point that Searle’s social ontology neglects 
the historical component, and that his notion of collective intentionality “erases real history as 
well, by assuming that institutions are simply created on the spot” (Friedman 2006, p. 74), Searle 
rejects this criticism and affirms: “I am struck by the fact that institutions with entirely different 
histories can have similar logical structures […] I am trying to provide us with the tools within 
which that history can be intelligibly described. There is no opposition between the historical ap-
proach and the analytical approach. They are complementary to each other and, indeed, unless 
we have our analytic categories right to begin with, we cannot hope to give an intelligent account 
of the histories in question” (Searle 2006a, p. 84). The problem here is that when analytic catego-
ries (and in particular, the analytic categories related to the phenomena of acceptance/recogni-
tion) are formulated “right to begin with” and only afterwards applied to historical empirical 
contents, then they end up being characterized within a dualism between form and content (a 
priori logical forms and a posteriori historical contents to which they apply) which abstracts 
from historically developed unities of content and form of social recognitive practices. For such a 
dualism between “underlying” fundamental logical structures analyzed by analytic social ontol-
ogy, and historical phenomena reconstructed by historicist approaches, see also Searle’s reply to 
Neil Gross’ objections (Searle 2006b, p. 68).
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imply the need to explicitly distinguish between objectification and reification. 
Ontologically objectified forms of acceptance (that is, institutions) may be, but 
do not have to be, reified, that is, forms of social objectification which, asserting 
themselves with the false appearance of inescapability and immutability, end up 
acting causally over us in a way which blocks further rational change, and con-
strains us in an unfree form of life. The notion of reification would here be the 
ontological complement to the idea that some forms of objectification are unfree 
and irrational.
In the final analysis Searle’s social ontology is a philosophy of sociality 
without criticism, or a merely positive ontology. Social ontology is here under-
stood as a descriptive theory of the second natural sphere of social objects and 
of their constitution which does not include a critical side, that is, theoretical 
tools to criticize some forms of social second nature as negative, reifying, unjust, 
and so forth. In other words, Searle’s social ontology looks like a non-dialectical 
“ontology of the false state”, as Adorno would put it. Also, to use Horkheimer’s 
distinction between “traditional” and “critical” theories, Searle conceives the role 
of social philosophy as social ontology and its relation with empirical sciences in 
a traditional way. He calls his social ontology a “philosophy of society” in order 
to distinguish it from normative political and social philosophy concerned with 
the normative justification of political and social notions, as well as from the phi-
losophy of social sciences understood as methodological analysis of empirical 
disciplines and of their procedures (Searle 2010, p. 5). Social ontology, according 
to Searle, is a more fundamental discipline than political and social philosophy, 
philosophy of social sciences or empirical sciences. It analyzes the general logical 
features that are proper to, and that constitute the mode of being of the entities 
that are studied by empirical social sciences and justified by normative political 
philosophy (Searle 2010, p. 200–201). This is to say that Searle’s understanding of 
his philosophy of society appears to fall within the range of philosophical theories 
criticized by Horkheimer as “traditional” insofar as they understand social philos-
ophy as foundational, descriptive knowledge, concerned with a descriptive analy-
sis of fundamental spheres of social being and of their constitution, and capable of 
being developed independently of the results of empirical social sciences.
4   “Ontology of the False State”: Adorno’s 
Negative Dialectics
So far I have analyzed Searle’s approach, leaving in the background the two 
options on how to think of the relation between social philosophy, social 
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ontology and critical theory that emerged from Horkheimer’s texts. But in fact 
my critical reading of Searle could be understood as a hypothetical interpreta-
tion in light of the first option: if we were to choose the first option, then Searle’s 
approach could offer us some insights, even if it would not be able to satisfy the 
requirements of a critical theory of society. But what are we then to think of the 
relation between social philosophy and social ontology within critical theory? 
What about the second option, that is, the understanding of the social ontology 
of objective spirit as a dialectical “ontology of the false state”? Is this a viable 
option? And what does “ontology of the false state” mean exactly? This notion 
that Adorno uses in his Negative Dialectics to qualify dialectics – both Hegelian 
and his own ‘negative dialectics’ (Adorno 1966/1973, p. 11) – epitomizes a certain 
attitude towards social ontology within 20th century critical theory. This attitude 
presupposes the identification of ontological forms with invariant structures and 
of ontological theories with instances of “identity thinking”: a theoretical and 
practical way of thinking prone to essentialization, that is, to transforming what-
ever comes under its grip into an essential, meta-historical structure. According 
to Adorno, once Hegel describes objective spirit as “second nature”, that is, as a 
social world whose structures can be described as a realm of objects distinct from 
the objects of first natural physical nature, he is already reifying spirit (Adorno 
1966/1973, p. 356–357). In this way Adorno takes up the Marxist idea that György 
Lukács had already developed in his Theory of the Novel, denouncing the second 
natural sphere of juridical, economical, social and political structures as stiff-
ened, frozen spirit (Lukács 1920/1971, p. 140–156): an objectified sphere consist-
ing of relations between persons reduced to dead things, to relations between 
(social) objects. Thought of in this way, the objective sphere of second nature is 
hence identified with reification.
According to Adorno, the Hegelian theory of objective spirit, in compari-
son with classical economy and Kantian thought, already reveals the historical 
and social mediation of the second natural sphere of institutions, but in the end 
transforms such mediation into an essence, into an invariant meta-historical 
structure. One should note that the reason why the Hegelian theory of objective 
spirit is, according to Adorno, an “ontology of the false state” is not exactly the 
fact that Hegel in the end falls back into ontological thought – understood as an 
instance of identity thinking. This would be merely paraphrasing how Adorno 
understands the notion of “ontology”, but it would not contribute much to an 
understanding of the relation between “ontology” and the “false state”. By char-
acterizing Hegel’s dialectical theory of objective spirit as an “ontology of the false 
state” Adorno wants to say something more than that. He means that the theory 
of objective spirit is a description of the structure of a reified social world, and 
thus really refers to an existing ontological state of things, even if a false, reified 
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one. If this is true, then Hegel’s theory of objective spirit is in fact a fitting social 
ontological description of the constitution of the structures of being of the objec-
tive world of institutions: the only problem is that Hegel’s ontology of the false 
state is merely descriptive and not critical. Hegel describes as true and justified 
social structures that should instead be criticized as false qua result of reification. 
This is why Adorno also characterizes his own ‘negative dialectics’ as an “ontol-
ogy of the false state”, yet in contrast to Hegel’s as a critical one.
We need to see the paradoxical character of such use of the idea of “ontology 
of the false state”. Adorno does not want to embrace ontology, which he equates 
with a reifying attitude that understands being as an invariant structure. This is 
why the very notion of social ontology would sound contradictory to him. Still 
he needs to understand the theory of objective spirit as a description of the con-
stitution of the social world of second nature. We could say, using Horkheimer’s 
terminology, that Adorno himself understands the theory of objective spirit as 
a kind of social philosophy, and furthermore that he recognizes the ontological 
commitment of this theory, which describes the objective structures of the histori-
cal social world. But since he cannot develop this commitment into an affirmative 
ontological theory, he ends up presupposing a negative social ontology that he 
cannot give an account of. This is why he understands “second nature” merely 
negatively, as a reified sphere. If this were not the case – if there were no implicit 
ontological commitment in his theory – dialectics as a theory of objective spirit 
could not be a simultaneously descriptive and critical theory. Without being 
implicitly committed to a socio-ontological view of the dynamic constitution of 
social facts, critical theory would not be able to describe objective spirit as reified.
On the other hand, if Adorno would positively develop this commitment 
into a socio-ontological theory, then on his negative explicit understanding of 
social ontology, his dialectics would turn into a legitimating theory of a reified, 
false state of things. This is why Adorno’s project of developing a critical theory 
without ontology is always on the verge of turning into a mere negative social 
ontology (that is, into a theory which involves a social ontology but can refer to 
it only negatively, by way of criticizing the “ identity thinking” form of current 
ontological models). This is the paradox Adorno is faced with whenever he strives 
to put together and mediate dialectically within critical theory both social self-
reflection and social totality or social mediation,11 or in other words the socio-
epistemological moment of self-reflection as social knowledge on the one hand, 
and the socio-ontological notion of totality or the idea of the constitution of 
objects through social mediation on the other.
11 See Renault 2011 for an analysis of the different levels – dialectical, systemic, and dynamic – of 
the relation between self-reflection and social totality in Adorno.
Brought to you by | Università degli Studi di Palermo
Authenticated
Download Date | 9/24/15 10:08 AM
288      Italo Testa
It should be clear by now that what triggers this paradoxical and in the end 
untenable movement to Adorno’s position is the fact that he identifies objectifi-
cation as ontological constitution of the social world with reification. Following 
the tradition opened by Lukács – not only in his Theory of the Novel but also in 
his History and Class Consciousness (1923)/1971a) – Adorno is prone to thinking 
in his Negative Dialectics that every objectification is reifying, and thus that 
second nature always has to be criticized as a reified realm.12 We could say then 
that whereas Searle does not distinguish between objectification and reifica-
tion, Adorno tends to think that every objectification is reification.13 Let me 
12 This is the thesis underlying the excursus on “World spirit and natural history” (Adorno 
1966/1973, p. 300–360). Note that in his early writings Adorno was keen to use the notion of 
second nature not only in a negative meaning, but also as an affirmative ontological category, 
apt to grasp the ontological element of “transience” (Adorno 1932/1984, p. 120) which is common 
both to nature and history.
13 Even great, authentic works of art are cases of “objectification [Objektivation]”, which, in a 
false society, come to be inescapably entangled, already in their form, with some sort of reifi-
cation. “Art”, as Adorno writes in his essay on Commitment, “even in its opposition to society 
remains a part of it” (Adorno 1965/1980, p. 193–194). For this reason even works of art which are 
a model of “integrity” cannot escape the effects of reification (this is the reason why Adorno 
writes that “today every phenomenon of culture, even if a model of integrity, is liable to be 
suffocated in the cultivation of kitsch”, Adorno 1965/1980, p. 194). Still, notwithstanding the 
reified situation in which they are themselves entangled – the “crystallization” by which their 
form is affected – and in some sense by way of radicalizing their reified form, eminent works of 
art can paradoxically point to something different, to the idea of a praxis which would produce 
just forms of life. In this sense, authentic works of art do not overcome by themselves reifica-
tion, but rather through reification point towards a counterfactual state of things. We may as-
sume that in such a just form of life, social praxis would not be paradoxically entangled with 
reification. I am not sure, however, that Adorno, at least in his Negative Dialectics, could apply 
the notion of “ objective spirit” to describe such a reconciled situation, as he thinks that such a 
category is intrinsically affected by the false condition it describes. As I have suggested, a major 
reason why he is prone to think this way, is that the notion of “objective spirit” according to 
him is  indebted to identity thinking. That is why in Negative Dialectics the occurrences of the 
expression “ objective spirit” (Adorno 1966/1973, p. 179, 204, 307, 308, 325) mainly have a pejo-
rative meaning (this happens in this book also to the notion of “Objektivation [Objektivation; 
Objektivierung]”). Consequently, when he comes to hint at a right form of life, and in order to 
avoid the paradoxical consequences to which the use of ontologically committed notions such 
as ‘objective spirit’ would lead, he uses utopian images such as that, taken from Joseph von 
Eichendorff, of “beautiful strangeness [schoene Fremde]” (an expression which was unfortu-
nately not included in the English translation, and which refers to what Adorno describes as the 
situation where “the alien, in the proximity it is granted, remains what is distant and different, 
beyond the heterogeneous and beyond that which is one’s own” (Adorno 1966/1973, p. 191). One 
could counter-argue that Adorno, for example in the Commitment essay, when he analyzes the 
structure of the works of art, affirms that “objectification” (Adorno 1965/1980, p. 183) is a neces-
sary moment of every work of art – hence, using the expression in a non pejorative sense – and 
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add the further hypothesis that this is related to the fact that Lukács and those 
who follow him tend to understand alienation (Entfremdung) in terms of objec-
tive alienation.14 This has had a strong impact on classical and contemporary 
critical theory – as we will see again when we come to analyze Axel Honneth’s 
theory of reification – and it has influenced the negative attitude towards social 
ontology that prevails in this tradition. According to such an understanding, 
alienation would essentially be due to the constitution of spheres of objectifica-
tion. These are dominated by anonymous complexes of instrumental rationality 
that become autonomous and exert an overarching domination over individu-
als, depriving them of their essential capacities. Alienation would be essentially 
reification (Verdinglichung, Versachlichung). Thus the burden of social consti-
tution is fundamentally shifted to the objective side of anonymous, systemic 
objective processes, underestimating the weight that subjective-intersubjective 
practices play within the dynamics of both social constitution and aliena-
tion. According to Lukács’ History and Class Consciousness, within modern 
capitalism reification assumes the form of commodity fetishism. Commodities 
become the general form of “social being as a whole” (Lukács 1923/1971a, p. 86, 
my translation), that is, the general form of the social world as reified second 
nature, constituted by the objective mode of production of modern capitalism. 
This makes it clear that the negative theory of second nature inaugurated by the 
young Lukács and adopted by Adorno in fact conceals a hidden social ontol-
ogy, and it also explains why the late Lukács, once he had given up his notion 
of reification (Verdinglichung) in favor of a more traditional notion of aliena-
tion (Entfremdung), would come to explicitly understand the Marxist theory of 
modern capitalism as a form of social ontology (Lukács 1971/1978–1980).
criticizes Sartre as subjectivist for not acknowledging that. Hence, Adorno should in principle 
distinguish the mechanism of “objectification” from the mechanism of reification. Moreover, in 
his Negative Dialectics he affirms that the overcoming of reification would not merely consist 
in “liquefying” every “thingness [Dingheit]” (Adorno 1966/1973, p. 189) and connects this with 
the thesis of the “preponderance of the object” – which means that in the relation between 
subject and object there is an asymmetry in favor of the latter. But since he cannot acknowledge 
the ontological commitments objectification implies, in the end he is not able to categorically 
distinguish the mechanism of objectification from that of reification, and ends up putting the 
burden of objectification mostly on the shoulders of reifying social processes. In other words, 
Adorno is not able to affirmatively connect the thesis of the ‘preponderance of the object’ with 
a theory of social objectification, since this would imply the use of ontological categories he 
is not willing to adopt. 
14 For a reading and a criticism of Lukács’ reduction of alienation to objective alienation through 
the use of the theory of reification see Haber 2007, p. 116–134.
Brought to you by | Università degli Studi di Palermo
Authenticated
Download Date | 9/24/15 10:08 AM
290      Italo Testa
5  Towards a Critical Social Ontology
So far we have been discussing, and tried to appreciate the advantages and limits 
of a positive social ontology of objectification in the form of Searle’s a-dialectical 
theory of the social world as objectification of linguistic acts on the one hand, 
and a negative ontology of reification or an ontology of the “false state” that we 
find in the early Lukács and Adorno on the other hand. Since both approaches 
have serious problems, I would now like to come back to option (1) which we saw 
emerging from Horkheimer’s essays of the thirties, that is, the possibility of devel-
oping critical theory in terms of a critical social ontology that can be both descrip-
tive and critical of the social constitution of the objective world of social and 
historical being. Of course this implies the possibility of elaborating within social 
ontology a conception of social and historical reality that escapes the essential-
ism of traditional ontological theories – a possibility that the young Adorno had 
in fact pursued in his effort to elaborate an ontology of natural history under-
stood as transient being, but which he later rejected.15
My suggestion is that in order to work out the relationship of critical theory 
and social ontology in a non-paradoxical way, and to develop a critical account 
of social and historical being, the nexus between social ontology and recognition 
theory needs to be clarified. The need to work out the relationship of social ontol-
ogy and recognition theory is due not only to the fact that recognition theory is 
nowadays the core of contemporary critical theory of society in its different ver-
sions – in Habermas, Honneth, Fraser, and others. Our reading of Searle provided 
us with a supplementary insight, emerging from outside critical theory, into the 
socio-ontological role of recognition. From Searle (and Hegel) we can take up the 
idea of the recognitive constitution of social objects, or of the constitution of the 
second natural sphere of the social world through recognitive objectification. I 
argued that this could help us in re-evaluating the very idea of objectification 
(through recognition) within social ontology, an idea that should be extended to 
an understanding of the constitution of intersubjective self-consciousness that is 
left aside by Searle’s account of the social world. We have seen that Searle’s social 
ontology lacks a socio-ontological account of the subjective/intersubjective side 
of recognition that Hegel developed through his account of self-consciousness as 
constituted through reciprocal recognition.
I have argued that in order to be critical, social ontology should not confine 
itself to mere description of the constitution of social objects, but should take up 
from critical social philosophy the task of providing a critical diagnosis of social 
15 Here Adorno affirms the need for a “double [doppelte]” “ontological turn [ontologische Wend-
ung]” in philosophy (Adorno 1932/1984, p. 121). 
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reification. This means introducing a distinction between necessary mechanisms 
of objectification constitutive of social objects, and additional mechanisms of rei-
fication providing some forms of objectivation and the resulting social objectivity 
with an appearance of necessity and immutability and thus constraining free, 
rational agency. Doing so would finally vindicate in a non-paradoxical way the 
very idea of critical social philosophy as ontology of the false state.
5.1  Honneth’s Fundamental Ontology of Recognition
With the results of the previous sections in mind, I will now turn my attention to 
Axel Honneth, a contemporary critical theorist in whose work the theories of rec-
ognition and reification are brought together. I will read Honneth’s work in terms 
of the framework that I have developed so far, sketching out some ideas on how 
an ontology of intersubjective recognition such as Honneth’s could be combined 
with a social ontology of the constitution of the objective sphere through recog-
nitive objectification. Starting from his seminal Struggle for Recognition (1995) 
Honneth has developed a model which identifies three “spheres of recognition”: 
love as care for the well-being of others as vulnerable embodied beings, respect 
as universalistic acknowledgment of others as independent persons, and social 
esteem as appreciation of others’ contribution to social cooperation. These three 
spheres designate three different types of reciprocal interaction that are neces-
sary conditions for the development of positive self-relations and relations to 
others, and thus of full autonomy. Their denial – the experience of misrecognition 
– may lead to negative forms of self-relation and relation to others, but it may also 
furnish a motivational basis for struggles for recognition. What is interesting here 
is that recognition is not simply assumed as a primitive, not further analyzable, 
ahistorical notion (as is the case in Searle), but rather as a phenomenon which 
comes in different forms (Honneth’s claim, right or wrong, is that at least three 
basic forms of the intersubjective level of the phenomenon can be identified), and 
allows for social and historical variation (the forms of intersubjective recognition 
constitutive of modern subjects are assumed to be different from those – centered 
on honor and less differentiated – that were constitutive of pre-modern subjects). 
Secondly, Honneth follows the Hegelian idea that self-consciousness is mediated 
by recognition, and develops this into a model of the recognitive constitution of 
practical intentionality – a model which could in principle be further developed 
within a socio-ontological framework. Finally, Honneth’s focus on the strug-
gles for recognition has the advantage of making it clear that the phenomenon 
of recognition is animated by an internal conflictive dynamic which historically 
intertwines consent and dissent, acceptance and refusal, and whose logic is to be 
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rooted at the level of practices of reciprocal interaction. There is thus much more 
to be said about the presence or absence of recognition than Searle manages to 
say.
Later in his book Reification (2008) Honneth deepens the ontological dimen-
sion of his account of recognition. Recognition theory becomes now explicitly 
socio-ontological in that it is an ontology of the intersubjective foundations of 
human praxis. This new ontological understanding of recognition provides us 
with a frame that can better illuminate the ontological significance of recogni-
tion and the intersubjective dynamics of acceptance left unarticulated by Searle. 
Honneth’s understanding of intersubjective recognition could thus make a con-
tribution to contemporary social ontology, delivering a number of conceptual 
tools that Honneth formerly developed independently of an ontological model, 
and that might be useful for analyzing the intersubjective dynamics of accept-
ance which Searle leaves unarticulated. But rather than concentrating on how to 
make fruitful use of Honneth’s previous triadic theory of intersubjective recogni-
tion within contemporary social ontology, I will rather concentrate here on how 
ontology works in his book Reification. The point I want to stress is that Honneth 
in fact does not explicate the ontological significance of recognition with refer-
ence to the socio-ontological Hegelian thesis concerning the recognitive consti-
tution of self-consciousness and objective spirit, but rather through recourse to 
a Heidegger-inspired fundamental ontology of “care” (Sorge) (Honneth 2008, 
p. 28–40).
The reason for this seems to be that Honneth now wants to develop the 
ontology of recognition in terms of primary structures of intersubjectivity that 
are not themselves socially constituted. He is interested in an “existential” mode 
of recognition that he conceives as the normative foundation for the three more 
substantial forms of recognition (Honneth 2008, p. 90n70). Hence, rather than 
analyzing the socio-ontological significance or structure of the more substantial 
forms of recognition themselves, Honneth concentrates on grounding the three 
spheres in a more primary sphere which he conceives in terms of an existential 
ontology. As a consequence, Honneth does not elaborate in Reification on the 
socio-ontological role of recognition and thus on its role in the constitution of 
social objects (objective spirit, the social world).
Furthermore, Honneth takes up from the Lukácsian tradition a negative 
account of second nature, describing reification as petrified second nature 
(Honneth 2008, p. 24–25). Thus what we have is, on the one hand a positive exis-
tential ontology of recognitive intersubjectivity; and on the other hand a negative 
ontology of reification as oblivion of recognition. Honneth understands reifica-
tion in a classical Lukácsian way as relations between persons materializing 
themselves in relations between objects so that the interpersonal relations are 
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concealed. And he conceives of relations between persons as original recogni-
tive relations, understood in terms of an affective, evaluating and participating 
attitude that is ontologically fundamental insofar as it is not itself socially consti-
tuted. This attitude is not a matter of second nature, or acquired disposition, but 
is “original” (Honneth 2008, p. 35, 54–55). Reification on the other hand is to be 
understood here as something second natural: as a social habit that comes to be 
rooted in customs and in our very agency through socialization (Honneth 2008, 
p. 25).16
Honneth does in fact distinguish between reifying and non-reifying objec-
tification, and on this basis he criticizes Lukács for having simply identified 
objectification with reification (Honneth 2008, p. 65). According to Honneth, 
recognition is a condition of possibility of all objectification, and reifying 
objectification is characterized by some kind of “forgetting” of this condition. 
But unfortunately Honneth limits his discussion to epistemological objectifi-
cation and does not elaborate on the socio-ontological role of objectification 
more generally. Were he to do so, he would need to use the notion of “second 
nature” also in a positive sense, for describing the constitution of social and 
institutional objects and structures, instead of using it merely for criticizing 
reified ones.17 The fact that Honneth limits his discussion to epistemic objectifi-
cation may be responsible also for the fact, noted in the literature, that he does 
not seem able to socially and historically substantiate the forms of reification 
he describes in the book.18 Forms of reification are not rooted in Honneth’s con-
ception in substantive material and historical practices of recognitive objec-
tification, but are described merely as derived manifestations of interaction 
that are oblivious of their foundation in the original affective recognition. I 
suggest that here we would need to develop a broader conception of the role 
of recognition in objectification and thus in the constitution of social objects. 
Such a conception would be able to encompass both reified and non-reified 
16 Note however that there is a certain asymmetry between what Honneth calls “original” habits 
of recognition and natural social habits of reification. The former are supposed to be “funda-
mental” existential dispositions – first nature? – whereas the latter are acquired and thus second 
nature dispositions. See Honneth 2008, p. 33 (“the original ‘caring’ character of this activity”), 
53 (“original form of behavior”).
17 A positive use of the notion of “second nature” is compatible with the Hegelian framework 
Honneth develops in his later Freedom’s Right (2014). Still, as I will argue later, the Hegelian 
framework is developed here in the fashion of a normative political theory, whereas the socio-
ontological layer remains underdetermined.
18 See, for instance, Jutten 2010, who argues that Honneth’s account lacks historical substance, 
and Chiari 2010, according to whom this depends on the fact that Honneth separates the norma-
tive aspects of reification from an analysis of their socio-economical basis.
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institutions (including self-consciousness understood as a social institution) 
as a second natural realm.
Let me end my discussion of Honneth with some remarks on the fate of this 
issues in his recent ambitious project of Freedom’s Right (2014). In this book 
Honneth develops a Hegelian theory of modern institution as “objective spirit” 
“realizing” or “embodying” normative relations.19 Still, even in this work Honneth 
does not introduce conceptual tools for grasping objective spirit in terms of a 
socio-ontologically characterized notion of recognition, an undertaking which 
would involve giving an account of recognitive constitution of both social institu-
tions and social subjects by means of the notion of objectification. In character-
izing “objective spirit” Honneth talks loosely of “embodiment” and “realization”, 
without spelling out the socio-ontological meaning of these terms (see, for 
instance, Honneth 2014, p. 3, 4, 113). And where he in fact uses the notion of 
“objectification”, he does not connect it positively with “recognition” (Honneth 
2014, p. 3, 50, 53, 90, 169, 171).20 One of the reasons why Honneth does not follow 
the socio-ontological path, is probably that he is still indebted to Lukács’ negative 
account of second nature, and still shares something of Adorno’s suspicion of an 
affirmative deployment of the socio-ontological commitments of social theory. 
This may also be somehow related to the problems that Honneth encountered in 
his previous project, where he was not able to historically and materially substan-
tiate the phenomenon of reification. In Freedom’s Right Honneth seems to have 
abandoned reification as a key concept in his project (the word does not occur at 
all in the book) and is therefore also driven to drop the ontological understanding 
of recognition that he had adopted in Reification. As a consequence, whereas in 
Reification we are faced with an ontologically characterized notion of recogni-
tion without a theory of objective spirit, in Freedom’s Right we find a notion of 
objective spirit without a socio-ontological understanding of recognition and its 
objectification.21 Hence, though Honneth’s work is an important step towards the 
19 See Honneth 2014, p. 4: “Every society embodies objective Spirit to a certain extent, because 
its institutions, social practices and routines reflect shared normative beliefs about the aims of 
cooperative interaction.”
20 At p. 233 and 234 (Honneth 2014) the relation between recognition and ‘objectification’ finally 
shows up but only in the context of the discussion of the alienating effects of modern divided 
labor. Hence, when he writes that “objectifying activity of labour relies on mutual recognition 
in an overall social framework,” Honneth is not really capturing the overall internal relation 
between recognition and objectification, but is instead saying that even “objectified activity” 
resulting from reifying processes presupposes that at some level there are mutual recognitive 
relations.
21 Such a tension seems to be due to a sort of dualism between an ontological and a normative 
approach similar to the one which Jean-Philippe Deranty has detected as a major problem in 
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integration of social ontology and critical theory, due to the tensions we have 
detected it does not accomplish this task.
5.2  Reification and the Concealment of Social Contingency
Let me end with reflections on how to go about the concept of reification, fol-
lowing the insights discussed above. I have spoken of reification as additional 
objectification, that is, as a specific form that objectifications may take. Such a 
form has to be understood as a result of a social mechanism that masks the onto-
logical contingency, the socially produced character of certain objectifications 
by imposing on them an “appearance of necessity” to borrow from Adorno, that 
is, a false appearance of being necessarily binding, immutable, invariable, and 
inescapable.
Hence, reification has been characterized not as an epistemic, nor as a moral 
notion, but first and foremost as a socio-ontological one, since it involves a social 
fact, a specific way in which the social reality is constituted and experienced. This 
is the idea that Adorno tried to capture with the notion of a “false state of things”. 
Such a state of things is qualified as “false”, not because it violates some epis-
temic, moral, or social norms, nor because it betrays some more original, more 
authentic, or truer state of things, but because it masks or falsifies its origins, 
taking on an appearance of necessity. This is a socio-ontological characteriza-
tion of reification because what is falsified here is the ontological contingency of 
social being. Secondly, because such social structures, habitualized patterns of 
action and institutionalized norms, tend to “freeze” our way of life – think of the 
images of “frozen spirit” and “petrified second nature” in Lukács – that is, they 
prevent us from further developing our potentialities and block social change. A 
stronger way to grasp such a freezing effect would be to characterize it in terms 
of absence of freedom and rationality, or in other words as a state of things which 
does not enable our freedom to develop and which blocks rational modifications 
of the social setting. The reason why lack of rationality and absence of freedom 
are however not enough to qualify such forms of objectification, and why a 
further notion of reification is needed in order to account for them, is that we are 
the entire work of Honneth. The prevalence in Honneth’s model of the concern for normative 
foundation of modern society over the ontological moment, means as a consequence that the 
ontological understanding of recognition is weakened and deprived of material substantiation 
(see Deranty 2009, p. 476). I think this is reflected also in the fact that, when the ontological mo-
ment is made explicit, as happens in Reification, it tends to be framed in a proto normative way 
which is disconnected from substantive practices of objectification.
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here dealing with structures of the world out there, and moreover with structures 
which literally act causally over us – in the causal order of things rather than in 
the rational order of persons. Hence, to qualify them only as lacking rationality 
and not enabling freedom – that is, to qualify them only by means of a theory of 
agency or of a theory of rationality – would only capture negatively their consist-
ency and would miss their socio-ontological significance.
If this is right, then not only critical theory, but also contemporary social 
ontology should be concerned with reification as a phenomenon that concerns 
the constitution and the experience of many highly important social facts. Inter-
estingly, even if he never uses the word nor introduces a corresponding category, 
even Searle in fact acknowledges the phenomenon. In chapter 5 of Making the 
Social World Searle introduces the question “why do people accept institutions 
and institutional facts?” According to Searle this question does not admit “any 
general answer” (Searle 2010, p. 107–108). He notes however that “one feature 
that runs through a large number of cases is that in accepting the institutional 
facts, people do not typically understand what is going on” (Searle 2010, p. 107). 
Such an epistemic opacity of the origin of social facts is then connected with the 
idea that people tend to take such facts for granted and thus to naturalize them: 
“they tend to think of them as part of the natural order of things, to be taken for 
granted in the same way they take for granted the weather or the force of gravity.” 
Searle adds that at least some of these social facts – for instance, money and 
government – tend to work best when they are “taken for granted and not criti-
cally analyzed.” On his view many such taken-for-granted institutional facts are 
connected with false beliefs: “acceptance of an institutional fact or, indeed, of 
a whole system of status functions, may be based on false beliefs” (Searle 2010, 
p. 118–119). Searle gives as an extreme example of an institutional fact function-
ing only because it is not believed to be an institutional fact: this is the case of 
the Pope in the Catholic Church. The status function of the Pope only works as a 
status function precisely because it is believed to be supernatural, that is, not a 
status function. Furthermore, Searle seems keen to somehow connect the occur-
rence of such cases with unjust arrangements of society,22 even though he does 
not identify the two terms.
Unfortunately Searle has no general category under which to label these phe-
nomena, nor a theory which would connect them in an intelligible way. He merely 
refers to them as one specific answer to the question “why do people accept insti-
tutions?” And yet, one can see that such phenomena are easily framed under the 
concept of ‘reification’ of social facts, and that Searle’s discussion implies a certain 
22 See Searle 2010, p. 17: “Indeed, there are all sorts of institutions, where people cheerfully ac-
cept what would appear to be unjust arrangements”.
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understanding of what reification consists of. In this sense, Searle’s theory imma-
nently demands the concept of ‘reification’ to be explicitly introduced, and a dis-
tinction to be drawn between objectification and reification. This is because Searle 
needs tools for comprehending how free and rational agents can come to accept 
institutions which are not freedom enabling, but rather unjust and irrational.
As for the implicit understanding of reification that Searle’s position implies, 
two things have to be noted. First, Searle seems to conceive the phenomenon of 
reification as a matter of naturalization. Here Edouard Machery has argued that 
such an understanding of reification seems to be incompatible with the socio-
ontological apparatus of status acceptance/recognition as constitutive of social 
entities (Machery 2014). According to Machery, reification is a psychological phe-
nomenon that occurs when a social entity is taken to be something natural. This 
is a quite common phenomenon in social life and can apply to norms, social roles, 
social kinds, races, and objects endowed with social significance (such as money). 
Thought so, reification is a sort of “essentialization” of social kinds (Gelman 2003). 
In Machery’s view, the phenomenon of reification is incompatible with Searle’s 
thesis according to which social entities exist because people collectively recog-
nize that such entities have a social status. Since recognitive attitudes are under-
stood by Searle under the model of linguistic declarations, “entities believed to be 
natural, including reified entities, are not proper targets of recognition” (Machery 
2014, p. 93). If we believe, for instance, that races are natural, we cannot collec-
tively recognize, in the relevant sense, the social status of races.
Are then reification and a recognitive theoretical model incompatible? I 
suggest that they are only so under a particular way of understanding recogni-
tion. Namely, if one understands recognition, as Searle does, under the general 
model of linguistic declarations and intentional beliefs, then an incompatibil-
ity arises. But we are not obliged to conceive of recognition in this way. Once 
we allow that the basic occurrence of recognition is actually at the level of 
background practices, and conceive of recognition/acceptance in terms of pre-
intentional habits rather than intentional beliefs, the incompatibility does not 
arise. This is to say that entities can be objects of habitual recognition, while at 
the same time believed to be natural. The tendency to take some social kinds 
for granted is not primarily a matter of having beliefs, or consciously thinking 
something of something, but rather a matter of having pre-intentional habits 
(which may or may not be accompanied by beliefs).23 Furthermore, reification 
23 Even if it were true, as Searle writes of some institutions, that people “tend to think of them 
as part of the natural order of things” (Searle 2010, p. 107), the important thing is that the notion 
of ‘tendency’ to which he appeals is what does the main job here and cannot be accounted for 
in terms of beliefs.
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is a social experience, and hence it is not just a matter of attributive attitudes, 
but also a mode of being of social life and a matter of being affected by social 
structures. This is why the notion of reification needs to be framed ontologically 
and in relation to habitual background practices of recognition. For the same 
reason, the core of reification cannot be identified with taking social entities to 
be natural entities. In some sense, every socio-ontological constitution implies 
a mechanism of taking something for granted. A phenomenological analysis 
of such a mechanism of taking something for granted reveals that social objec-
tification, insofar as it is effective, is connected with an experience of socially 
mediated immediacy, which is connected with a sense of living naturalness. 
This is what in the philosophical tradition has been addressed with the idea 
that the social world has the habitual mode of being of a second nature. But 
such a sense of living naturalness and of mediated immediacy is not the same 
as perceiving something as invariant, immutable, or essential. In fact, as both 
Adorno and John Dewey have argued (Dewey 1910; Adorno 1932/1984), the very 
notions of natural history and of second nature point towards an understand-
ing of nature as transient, contingent, as something intrinsically subject to 
change. Hence, essentialization and the semantics of naturalness should not be 
identified. Reification occurs rather when the living, self-moving naturalness 
of the social world is masked and contingent social objectifications present 
themselves, and are experienced, with the appearance of necessity and immu-
tability. As a consequence, reification is an additional objectification, where 
the socio-ontological mechanism of taking for granted objectifications assumes 
a form which conceals social contingency in a way which leads socially consti-
tuted facts and normative orders to work on us as dead things, as occurrences 
of a blind causal order.24
24 One may wonder whether the constitution of social objects does not require a certain amount 
of functional reification. Do we not somehow need, in order for social objectifications to work (or 
at least to work better), that they are not only taken for granted, but also that their social origin 
is somehow concealed from us? This is what also Searle at some point seems keen to think, when 
he says that in accepting institutional facts, “people do not typically understand what is going 
on,” and that some institutions seem to work better just because they are believed not to be so-
cially constituted. If this were the case, then it would consist of a functional mechanism of social 
life which reinforces social objectifications and is hence not always something to be criticized. 
Whether or not we may label this as “functional reification,” the important point is that such a 
mechanism of concealment would be double-edged, since it could become the basis of social 
blindness, leading to appearances of necessity that would have a blind causal and constraining 
impact on our lives. That would be a false state of things. 
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